AI can compare markets faster than most teams could have imagined a few years ago. It can size opportunities, identify competitors, summarise regulations and surface potential customers or partners in minutes.
The harder question is whether it can tell you where your business should expand.
Imagine you are comparing two international markets. The first is larger, growing faster and has more potential customers. The second is smaller, but your product is easier to sell there, distribution costs are lower and customers tend to pay faster.
Which market is more attractive?
That depends on your business.
A company with limited working capital may favour shorter payment cycles and modest upfront investment. A business with an established distributor network may be comfortable entering markets that would be expensive for a company relying on direct sales. Regulatory approvals, channel margins, landed costs, pricing power and the resources required to support customers can all change the economics of an opportunity.
This is where international market selection becomes more than a research exercise.
A truce can buy companies time
Neither government appears eager to return to the tariff escalation seen earlier in the trade dispute.
The current arrangements grew out of the Busan agreement in late 2025 and Trump’s visit to Beijing in May. The White House says the May talks covered rare earths, agricultural purchases, Boeing aircraft and new bilateral trade and investment mechanisms.
Ahead of the Washington summit, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng have been holding talks aimed at preparing possible agreements on trade, critical minerals and AI.
Recent analysis from CSIS, East Asia Forum and the Australian Financial Review points towards continued détente rather than a comprehensive settlement. CSIS’s Scott Kennedy expects both sides to preserve the commercial ceasefire because renewed escalation would create economic costs neither government currently needs. East Asia Forum reaches a similar conclusion, arguing that continued leader-level engagement can help contain tensions even where the institutional foundations for a more durable settlement remain weak.
For businesses, the duration and detail of any extension will matter more than the symbolism of another handshake.
A company deciding whether to build a plant, qualify an alternative supplier or establish a regional operation is committing capital over several years. A short extension of tariff arrangements may improve near-term planning without giving management much confidence about the conditions that will apply over the life of that investment.
That is one reason the underlying moves on both sides deserve as much attention as the summit communiqué.
Critical minerals show where the leverage sits
Rare earths have become one of the clearest examples of commercial dependence turning into strategic leverage.
China’s role in the production and processing of critical minerals gives it influence over supply chains used in vehicles, electronics, defence equipment and advanced technologies. Washington has responded by supporting alternative sources, domestic processing and new supply arrangements with partners.
The United States and Australia already have a framework aimed at expanding secure mining and processing capacity, including investment support, offtake arrangements and measures intended to diversify critical-minerals supply chains. The Trump administration has also announced new investments in domestic and overseas mining projects intended to reduce reliance on foreign supply.
At the same time, the United States controls important parts of the advanced semiconductor ecosystem that Chinese technology companies need.
NPR reports continuing disagreement over whether China has restored rare-earth flows as expected and over US technology restrictions affecting Chinese companies. The AFR describes the current détente as a period in which Washington is seeking alternative mineral supply while Beijing pushes its own chipmakers to narrow the technology gap.
As governments become more willing to restrict access to strategically important inputs, companies can no longer assess supply-chain resilience by looking only at their immediate suppliers. A business may source from several vendors in different countries and still depend on the same Chinese processor, magnet producer, semiconductor technology or piece of manufacturing equipment further upstream.
Companies with international operations increasingly need to understand those deeper dependencies because access can be affected by export licences, sanctions and government negotiations taking place far from the business itself.
AI belongs in the same conversation
Artificial intelligence adds another layer to the same problem.
US and Chinese officials are expected to discuss AI risks and possible guardrails alongside trade and critical minerals. Reporting ahead of the summit suggests that the discussions could include cybersecurity, advanced models and the extent to which the two countries’ AI systems continue to interact.
The AFR reports that analysts expect any agreement to concentrate on relatively narrow areas such as reducing the risk from major cyber incidents involving AI systems, rather than producing a broad framework governing frontier AI development.
Even limited cooperation matters commercially because AI increasingly depends on a much wider technology stack: advanced chips, cloud infrastructure, energy, data, software and specialist talent.
Companies operating across several markets may find that decisions about AI providers or cloud infrastructure also carry implications for market access, regulatory compliance and future interoperability. The possibility of greater separation between US and Chinese technology ecosystems therefore affects much more than the technology sector itself.
The companies surrounding the summit reinforce that point. Reporting has linked the visit with senior executives from major US technology companies and Chinese businesses in electric vehicles, batteries and consumer technology. These sectors sit directly inside the competition over AI, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing and energy technologies.
The effects will travel beyond the United States and China
The bilateral relationship matters partly because adjustments between Washington and Beijing can redirect pressure into other markets.
The International Centre for Defence and Security has raised this issue from a European perspective. Its analysis argues that an improvement in US–China trade relations could leave the European Union dealing with its own trade tensions with Beijing under different conditions.
East Asia Forum makes a related argument for Asia. It sees a US–China truce as helpful in reducing the immediate risk of escalation while leaving a more protectionist regional trading environment in place. Its authors point to Australia, Japan and ASEAN economies as having an interest in making fuller use of regional frameworks such as the CPTPP and RCEP.
Chinese manufacturing capacity adds another dimension.
Bloomberg has reported that the Trump administration has been considering further tariffs linked to concerns about excess Chinese manufacturing capacity, with any announcement expected after the summit. If additional barriers eventually restrict more Chinese exports into the United States, producers will have stronger incentives to pursue customers, manufacturing locations and investment opportunities elsewhere. That could intensify competition in third markets while creating new investment flows into countries that offer better access to regional customers.
Australia could feel both sides of that adjustment. If Chinese producers redirect more exports into Asia-Pacific markets, Australian companies may face stronger price competition in sectors where those products overlap. At the same time, US efforts to reduce reliance on Chinese strategic supply chains could create new opportunities for Australian miners, processors and technology companies, particularly in critical minerals.
The commercial impact will depend heavily on the sector. For some Australian businesses, greater US–China friction could increase competitive pressure. For others, it could create new sources of demand, investment and supply-chain activity.
What the summit can tell businesses
The most important outcomes on 24 September may be relatively technical.
The duration of the trade arrangements will indicate how much policy visibility companies can reasonably expect. Changes to rare-earth licensing and semiconductor controls will show whether each side is prepared to relax pressure at strategic points in the supply chain. AI discussions may provide early evidence of where Washington and Beijing believe limited cooperation is possible despite continued technological competition.
Implementation will matter as much as the headline agreements.
Previous meetings have produced commitments covering aircraft, agriculture and mineral supply, while recent reporting points to continuing disputes about delivery. Companies making investment decisions will need to watch whether promised purchases occur, licences are issued and goods actually move.
The broader pattern is already clear. Washington and Beijing have strong incentives to prevent their economic relationship from becoming unmanageable, while both are spending heavily to reduce the strategic risks created by dependence on the other.
For businesses, this makes it more important to understand exactly where their international dependencies lie. Companies need to understand where critical inputs originate, where regulatory controls can interrupt them, how much revenue depends on a single market and where trade diversion could change the competitive landscape.
The Trump–Xi summit may give businesses greater visibility over the next phase of the relationship. The investment decisions being made around it suggest that both countries are preparing for strategic competition to remain a feature of international business well beyond 24 September.
